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Chapter 19
ASSESSING THE LEGAL RISKS IN
NETWORK FORENSIC PROBING
Michael Losavio, Olfa Nasraoui, Vincent Thacker, Jeff Marean, Nick
Miles, Roman Yampolskiy and Ibrahim Imam
Abstract This paper presents a framework for identifying the legal risks associated
with performing network forensics on public networks. The framework
is discussed in the context of the Gnutella P2P network protocol for
which the legal issues related to authorized access have not yet been
addressed.
Keywords: Network forensics, legal issues, authorized access, Gnutella protocol
1. Introduction
The analysis of legal issues related to investigations of network misuse
can help avoid misunderstandings about the application of law to com-
puter and network conduct. An understanding of the issues is important
for researchers who wish to avoid legal entanglements in the course of
conducting their research and for investigators who are working on cases
without the luxury of legal counsel.
An understanding of the application of law in this domain can also
influence the course of litigation. For example, Craig Neidorf was pros-
ecuted for the interstate transportation of stolen property (18 U.S.C.
§2314) for the electronic BBS transmission and posting of a BellSouth
911 manual sent to him by a friend [6]. However, the prosecution was
derailed when the government could not establish that the electronic ver-
sion of the publicly available document was property of any type. One
commentator attributed this to the conflict between traditional prop-
erty law concepts and online activity. Similarly, Robert Morris Jr., the
developer of the Internet worm, argued that he did not intend to cause
damage with the release of his worm and was, therefore, not guilty un-
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Table 1. Digital contraband and illegal conduct.
Contraband Illegal Conduct
Child pornography Possession; Receipt (18 U.S.C. §2251)
Obscene materials Possession; Distribution (18 U.S.C. §1460)
Creative content distributed in viola-
tion of copyright laws
Copying; Distribution (18 U.S.C. §2319)
Trade secret information Distribution (18 U.S.C. §1831)
Technology for circumventing copy-
right protection
Distribution (Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act)
Access devices (including passwords) Possession; Distribution (18 U.S.C. §1029)
der the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. In the Morris case, the court
found that malicious intent to do damage was not an element of the
crime, only the intent to access without authorization [22].
The core issue is one of “authorized access,” which addresses the con-
cerns found with the application of the concepts of trespass and invasion
of privacy to computers. Criminal and civil prohibitions on trespass pro-
tect against physical intrusion or interference with property. However,
prosecutions for trespass via electronic interactions with a computer lack
an actual physical invasion of property. The idea of access as an element
was developed for computers, and authorized access delineates permitted
and non-permitted access to data and system resources.
Digital forensic analysis of the distribution of contraband material
occurs in a variety of environments. These range from the examination
of a local machine on a network to the active harvesting of data by a
system that crawls a network, which includes node-based probing and
traffic monitoring [9, 13, 16]. This paper examines the legal implications
of active harvesting in which a local peer machine probes or monitors a
P2P network.
2. Basic Legal Framework
Contraband refers to artifacts or objects associated with illegal ac-
tivity, which includes their possession, distribution or use as prohibited
by law. State and private investigators and researchers are not immune
from criminal or civil liability for examining contraband items, regard-
less of motive. The conduct that is illegal varies with the contraband
items as described in Table 1.
Each offense may require a different level of criminal intent for guilt.
However, the conduct described may be sufficient for arrest and issuance
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of a search warrant to search/seize any machine that may have evidence
of such conduct.
Because of the range of offenses, five basic types of conduct form a
framework for legal analyses relating to computer misuse. The Euro-
pean Convention on Cybercrime describes them as offenses against the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems
[5, 15]. The five basic types of conduct are:
Unauthorized access to a computer, including exceeding authorized
access
Unauthorized interception of data
Unauthorized interference with data
Unauthorized interference with a system
Misuse of devices
Before using a network forensic tool on a network, the impact of the
tool should be evaluated in terms of these five types of conduct. A
checklist consisting of the conduct and the relevant offense may be made
in which the offense is identified as present, not present or unknown.
For each conduct and offense, the authority or claim of right must then
be identified. We demonstrate the application of this checklist on P2P
research in the context of United States law, specifically 18 U.S.C. §1030
and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) [11, 25].
3. Authorized Access
One may not legally access a computer or its resources without per-
mission. This statement belies the complexity regarding what consti-
tutes access and what constitutes authorized access. For example, an
individual may have permission to access some computer resources but
may not have permission to access all the resources.
It is useful to employ an analogy to physical trespass when analyzing
access issues, especially when considering the need to possess certain
items residing in some physical location. In an electronic environment,
the possession of digital objects can take place without any physical in-
vasion, but simply by transmitting certain commands across the network
[11].
The CFAA is the primary criminal statute that addresses the unautho-
rized access to computers that fall under federal jurisdiction. It prohibits
conduct ranging from simple (unauthorized) access to the impairment
of data integrity via the transmission of hostile code.
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The key elements of access and authorized access are not defined by
the CFAA. Instead, they are left to jurisprudential interpretation. A
U.S. federal court defined access as “to gain access to [or] to exercise
the freedom or ability to make use of something” in the America Online
(AOL) v. National Health Care Discount case [24]. In this case, the
defendant’s emailers harvested the addresses of AOL members and sent
unsolicited bulk email to the members [24]. AOL’s terms of service pro-
hibited this particular conduct and, as such, it was deemed unauthorized
access for which AOL was entitled to civil relief.
Another court dismissed an unauthorized access charge when the ev-
idence only showed that the defendant dialed up a computer using a
modem and viewed the login screen, but did not otherwise modify, copy
or possess anything from the computer. The appellate court noted that
until the defendant went beyond the initial banner and entered the ap-
propriate password, there was no ability to use and, thus, no access as
commonly understood [20].
Related to the access issue is the possession of digital objects and the
use of system resources. In the case of United States v. Simpson [23],
the federal court defined possession as “the holding or having something
(material or immaterial) as one’s own, or in one’s control.” In this
particular case, gaining root access to a remote machine gave dominion
and control and, thus, possession to all the files and resources on the
machine.
Kerr [8] notes that the technical/physical perspective is present in
other cases, as where evidence of repeated dialing activity coupled with
an admission that the conduct sought to find long-distance access codes
were found to be sufficient for access/computer trespass. Kerr also sug-
gests that access should be defined by an analogy to physical trespass as
the making of a “virtual entrance” into a computer or from the techni-
cal/physical operation of a computing machine over a network. Under
this definition, a failed attempt to log into a machine would not be an
access, but inputting and sending data to it would constitute access.
Similarly, Madison [12] suggests that the analysis varies between “In-
ternet as a place” (i.e., a trespass model) and “information as a thing”
(i.e., a theft model). This leaves little guidance as to what conduct con-
stitutes access. Instead, the definition becomes subject to a requirement
of authorization or right.
“Authorized (with right)” is the express granting of permission or
right authorizing access. User agreements for online services may ex-
pressly grant access, although special terms of use may apply. States,
by statute, may authorize certain types of access to certain groups of
individuals. A court order issuing a search warrant gives the serving
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officer permission to search and access a computer or system regardless
of the owner’s wishes. Similarly, a consent to access authorizes access
just as any consent to search a physical premises obviates the need for
a search warrant. The many exceptions to the requirement of a search
warrant in the United States may offer other examples of de jure autho-
rization (e.g., search incident to arrest), but these exceptions apply only
to state law enforcement officers acting within their police powers.
The difficult issue is online activity where there is no express per-
mission or right. There may or may not be an implicit authorization
to access online systems configured for open access, which accounts for
most of the content on the World Wide Web. The definition of what
constitutes “implicit authorization” is a distinct issue that must be sep-
arated from conduct.
Implicit authorization is a complex issue. Hale [7] posits that the use
of an open wireless local area network without express authorization is
a violation of the CFAA – there is no implicit authority to use it simply
due to its lack of access controls. Bierlein [2] notes that accessing an
open wireless local area network is potentially a misdemeanor under the
CFAA, but opines that the criminalization of such an act is unlikely.
Nevertheless, such cases have been prosecuted in several jurisdictions,
including the United States, Canada and Singapore [1, 10, 17].
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted there could be
an implicit limit on authorized access and expressly declined to adopt the
view that there is a presumption of open access to Internet information
[21]. The court noted that a “public website provider can easily spell
out explicitly what is forbidden and, consonantly, that nothing justifies
putting users at the mercy of a highly imprecise, litigation-spawning
standard like reasonable expectations.” Express “terms of service” have
been used to delineate authorized access such that any violation of the
terms becomes unauthorized access to the system [24]. However, Stanley
[19] argues that access to a public web page without any violation of the
terms of service should not be a CFAA violation in his analysis of the
SCO Group’s accusations against IBM employees who visited its website.
These examples do not clarify the legality surrounding the authority
to access a computer or network where there is not an explicit permission
or right. It leaves open a risk of a charge for lack of authority to which an
implicit authority claim must be made as a defense. One perspective is
that the Internet is based on the open exchange of information and tech-
nologies, and this inherently provides implicit authority. Alternatively,
access to open systems such as wireless networks without authority has
led to criminal prosecution. Perhaps, the extent of access may work
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along a sliding scale of access rights judged against the interference or
loss to the accessed machine, data or subject of the data.
4. Gnutella Case Study
Nasraoui, et al. [13] have presented a technical approach for moni-
toring contraband exchanges on Gnutella P2P networks. The approach
[4] involves crawling through a P2P network to collect network topol-
ogy data, P2P connections between nodes that identify their accessible
neighbors and actual network identifiers (e.g., IP addresses of nodes).
The Gnutella protocol has five messaging descriptors:
Ping: A Ping is used by a machine to find other host machines
that are active in a P2P network.
Pong: A Pong is a response to a Ping that notes that the node is
active and returns its IP address and what data it is sharing.
Query: A Query is issued by a node to find out if a particular
data resource is available for sharing by an active P2P node.
QueryHit: A QueryHit is the positive response by a node to a
Query noting that it has the data resource available for sharing.
Push: A Push permits a responding machine to share its data
through a firewall.
Common usage of the Gnutella protocol is to invoke an application
that pings other nodes, queries for available files, and then downloads
the files using the HTTP Get command.
5. Analysis of Authorized Access
Authorized access or access with right are assumed once a machine
is placed in a network and a P2P application is started without block-
ing the service in some way. Each Gnutella messaging descriptor makes
demands on a target machine for services, responses and data. Such
demands may be acceptable under an implicit authority theory for the
service. Gnutella has been described as “an open, decentralized group
membership and search protocol” [14], which implies permissions to par-
ticipate as part of the group through open access. The Gnutella speci-
fication offers support for this feature because it describes an open ex-
change system that may implicitly authorize access by the very use of
the protocol [4].
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Table 2. Checklist for basic legal issues in network access.
Service Category Machine Authority or










But this assumption may be unwarranted, as indicated in the Zefer
Corp. case [21], just as leaving a door unlocked does not authorize tres-
pass into a home. Also, in the Neidorf case [6], the defendant plead guilty
to unauthorized access although the access was via an open telephone
dial-up modem.
Assuming a sliding scale approach is tied to system demands, the
authority/right issue may be avoided for minimal message descriptors
like Ping. At the other end of the spectrum, implicit authority may
be required when services and data are made available (as with Get).
However, this may depend on some evidence of a knowing act by the
possessor of the target machine to open its services.
Ping, Query and Get constitute the bulk of the request and response
services used by Gnutella P2P applications. Table 2 presents an analysis
of these message descriptors in terms of authorized access.
The Ping messaging descriptor evokes a Pong response from a partic-
ipating node. A Ping does not access the pinged computer as defined by
statute. Rather, it makes use of a remote machine in that it provokes a
response that consumes system resources (no matter how small). Note
that it does not give a machine or user control over the remote machine
nor does it make any machine services available for use, which is one
definition of access.
When compared with the traditional notion of trespass, Ping is equiv-
alent to knocking on a door rather than actually entering the premises,
which is not considered trespass. While such analogies in computer law
and technology have occasionally led litigation astray (as in the Neidorf
case [6]), they can help analyze how the issue might be resolved by the
courts.
The Query messaging descriptor requests information on the resources
available from a particular node. A Query requires the remote machine
to examine certain resources, format a response and return the requested
information. A Query uses more node resources than a Ping. But it may
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not represent control sufficient to use the broader services of the remote
machine. Using the trespass analogy, a Query is analogous to knocking
on a door and asking who is behind the door without any physical entry.
When viewed in terms of dominion and control of a remote system,
a Query exercises minimal demands or control of system resources; it
merely acquires data from the system.
The Get messaging descriptor requests a particular resource from a
node and initiates an action by the remote system to return the re-
quested resource to the originating system. Get gives the requesting
machine greater control over the remote machine, permitting it to have
dominion and possession of digital objects on the remote machine and
(based on the configuration) to direct their copying and distribution
back to the requesting machine. Thus, is the use of Get an authorized
access? Probably, but a clear answer may not be possible under cur-
rent jurisprudence. One possible defense is mistake of fact (e.g., I didn’t
know), but it would depend on the wording of the particular criminal
statute (e.g., as in the Morris Internet worm prosecution [22]). In effect,
this leaves the authorization for P2P crawling – and a wide array of
online activities – open to interpretation.
6. Authorized Access for P2P Research Tools
A P2P research tool can be used to harvest data about query traffic
on a network [16]. The data is harvested by placing a machine/node on
the network that sends a file (bit vector) to an ultrapeer. This file serves
as a routing table with data asserting that the node can respond to all
queries sent to the ultrapeer. The bits in the routing table are set to
claim that all query keywords match files available at the node. When
the ultrapeer passes queries to the node, the node stores the query data
but does not respond to them.
The use of such a research tool may fall outside the expected use
of and interaction with a node on a P2P network. Further, the routing
table file is deceptive because it cannot respond to all queries as asserted.
The tool makes a representation for the purposes of data collection, but
does no file sharing.
With regard to the authorization for the tool, the context of implicit
authorization would involve transactions across the network designed to
facilitate its use for file and resource transfer. Because the tool acts only
to consume alternative resources for purposes unrelated to the actual
use of the network, it raises a question as to whether there is implicit
authorization for its operation.
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Note that federal statutes limit jurisdiction to situations as set out in
18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5)(A)(B)(i) [25] causing “loss to one or more persons
during any one year period ... aggregating at least $5,000 in value.”
Because it may be difficult or impossible to establish that this conduct
constitutes a loss in the jurisdictional amount, there would seem to be no
federal liability for this kind of research effort. However, for jurisdictions
that do not have a financial limitation amount, there may be exposure
to liability for the application of similar statutes.
7. Future Trends
The evolution of jurisprudence in this area is of importance to re-
searchers and investigators, who should continuously monitor new stat-
ues and case decisions. Kerr [8] suggests developing new statutes related
to authorized access that specifically address each type of computer mis-
use. A clear definition of access is required when a user sends a command
to a machine that, in turn, executes the command. This rejects the
virtual space/trespass analogy of a virtual entry into a machine. How-
ever, Kerr proposes that this broad meaning of access would change the
definition of access without authorization to access that circumvents re-
strictions by code. This negates contract law, keeps out analogs and, as
with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, offers regulation to control
access and ensure security.
The evolution of jurisprudence will also be affected as more case law
develops regarding other types of contraband (i.e., not restricted to child
pornography). The jurisprudence related to copyright prosecutions of
operators of P2P nodes may come to treat such activity differently. Sim-
ilarly, laws governing privacy rights may impact this analysis by focusing
further on an invasion of rights rather than a physical machine. Simon
[18], who describes a possible continuum of online privacy expectations,
posits that gaining evidence from a public chat room would not violate
the Fourth Amendment, but the use of services that increasingly pro-
tect privacy and control may render an online search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment or the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
It may also be necessary to consider whether legislative changes are
needed to provide opportunities for open research. There is a legislative
“safe harbor” for lawfully-authorized investigative activity by a law en-
forcement agency under the U.S. computer access statute, but this does
not apply to private investigators and researchers. Indeed, closing off
open research and limiting research to law enforcement entities may be
handing an advantage to those using P2P networks for illegal purposes,
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just as earlier federal limitations on encryption research damaged such
efforts within the United States.
8. Conclusions
Several pitfalls exist concerning the analysis of system use in networks,
both for investigators and researchers. Continued analysis of the legal
and ethical implications of the techniques is important to performing
investigations as well as developing and testing forensic tools.
Caloyannides [3] observes that, where digital evidence is concerned,
“the potential for a miscarriage of justice is vast.” It is essential that
any network research that seeks to address misconduct in the use of
networks – whether of contraband transactions or other illegal activity
– take into account possible legal restrictions. Good intentions are not
enough. Failure to satisfy the legal constraints can compromise the
evidentiary value of investigations as well as expose investigators and
researchers to legal liability and damage to reputation.
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